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Abstract
Public funding is believed to play an important role in the development of science and technol-
ogy. However, whether public funding and, in particular, competitive funding from public agen-
cies actually helps to increase scientific output (i.e. publications) remains a matter of debate. By
analysing a dataset of co-publications between China and the EU and a dataset of joint project col-
laborations in European Framework Programs for Research and Innovation [FP7 and Horizon
2020 (H2020)], we investigate whether different public funding agencies’ competitive assets have
different impact on the volume of publication output. Our results support the hypotheses that
competitively funded research output varies by funding sources, so that a high level of funding
does not necessarily lead to high scientific output. Our results show that FP7/H2020 funded proj-
ects do not have a positive contribution to the output of joint publications between China and the
EU. Interestingly, cooperation in the form of jointly writing proposals to these EU programmes,
especially when they are not granted by the European Commission, can contribute significantly
to joint scientific publications in a later stage. This applies in particular to cases where funding
from China is involved. Our findings highlight the key role that funding agencies play in influenc-
ing research behaviour. Our results indicate that Chinese funding triggers a high number of publi-
cations, whereas research funded by the EU does so to a much lower extent, arguably due to the
EU’s strong focus on social impact and its funding schemes as tools to promote European
integration.
Key words: competitive public funding; research evaluation; scientific output; international collaboration; China; EU member
states
1. Introduction
Scientific knowledge can be generated in two ways: it can either be
driven by academic interests within one discipline (also called ‘curi-
osity-oriented’ research) or it can be driven by needs from society,
created in a transdisciplinary social and economic context which is
led by industry or government (also called ‘strategic’ research) (see
more discussions in Gibbons et al. 1994; Salter and Martin 2001).
As scientific research requires access to substantial resources that are
costly (Stephan 1996, 2010), public funding is needed in both types
of research. In the former case, scientists can conduct research free-
ly, but in the latter case there is more intervention by governments
or funding agencies. The latter is seen as the prevailing model in
modern society, and academic research has been moving from
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discipline-based to social problems (Gibbons et al. 1994; Benner and
Sandstrom 2000).
Compared with general public funding (which is also called an
internal block funding model), competitive project funding gives
more direct monetary incentives to researchers to undertake certain
types of research (Stephan 2010). For social, economic, or political
aims, funding agencies can influence the scientific research carried
out by research institutes via financial stimulation (Benner and
Sandstrom 2000; Alberts et al. 2014; Ma, Mondrago´n and Latora
2015). Although the competitive project funding model has become
more prevalent over the years (Guena 2001; Wang, Lee and Walsh
2018), questions have been raised about the efficiency of competi-
tive project funding (Stephan 1996; Geuna 1999; Sandstro¨m and
Van den Besselaar 2018; Wang, Jacob and Li 2019; Confraria and
Wang 2020). In order to avoid an inefficient use of public resources,
it is important to understand whether public funds are spent effect-
ively and whether the peer review system can help to advance know-
ledge rapidly. This is not only important for evaluating the resource
allocation but also for providing instructions for productive invest-
ment in the future (Jacob and Lefgren 2011).
Although it is often believed that general public funding
increases scientific output, i.e. the number of publications (Payne
and Siow 2003; Beaudry and Allaoui 2012), the effect of competitive
project funding on scientific output has been subject of ongoing de-
bate. Competitive funding does not necessarily lead to high scientific
output, cf. Sandstro¨m and Van den Besselaar’s (2018) study where
competitive project funding was related to less efficient publication
output (both volume and quality) compared to research carried out
with a high degree of institutional funding. There are, however, also
noticeable differences between sources of external competitive fund-
ing, and they may stimulate funding outcomes in very different
ways. For example, Azoulay, Graff Zivin and Manso’s (2011) study
shows how differences in terms of freedom/control and acceptance
of failure among funding organizations (FOs) may lead to huge dif-
ferences in, e.g. the extent of highly cited papers. Fedderke and
Goldschmidt (2015) find that public funding can improve research
performance, but this is conditional on the capability of the
researchers. Highly ranked researchers present a higher rate of re-
turn on funding than those with low ranking peers. Wang, Lee and
Walsh (2018) also find differences in research novelty in different
funded groups. Auranen and Nieminen (2010) show that countries
with a relatively less competitive funding environment can be more
efficient in generating scientific output than those with a more com-
petitive funding environment.
Acknowledging that funded research to some extent may repre-
sent a complex set of strategies, priorities, and rules, i.e. intentions
of policy-makers to support basic research, we aim to explore how
policy-makers are using the funding as an instrument to steer aca-
demic research. Literature has shown that there are large differences
in efficiency between national science systems (Sandstro¨m and Van
den Besselaar 2018). In order to rule out the differences caused by
different cultures or traditions, we examine the effects of competi-
tive funding by looking at a set of joint publications and joint pro-
posals. The sample we use involves joint publications between
China and the EU member states and joint project collaborations/
proposals in The European Union’s Seventh Framework Program
for Research and Innovation (FP7) and Horizon 2020 (H2020). We
explore whether there is a difference in output of the FOs, thus
reflecting different strategies under which the competitive funds are
distributed.
Our results show how funding from China and the EU stimulate
different research behaviour, illustrated by differences in the propen-
sity to increase the publication output. According to our findings,
the Chinese government seems to provide funding with the aim of
increasing the recognizable and measurable scientific output, while
EU funding is often associated with knowledge exchange and social
impact, which may not directly be transferable to scientific output.
Interestingly, joint FP7/H2020 proposals that failed to receive fund-
ing, can significantly contribute to joint publications if they are later
funded by Chinese funding agencies. This emphasizes the crucial
role that funding agencies play in influencing research behaviour.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
the background of our empirical analysis. Section 3 documents data
collection and methodology. Results are provided in Section 4, and
Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
2.1 Funding and scientific research
It has been acknowledged that scientific research plays a crucial role
in industrial innovations (Nelson 1986; Jaffe 1989; Mansfield 1991,
1998; Wang and Li 2018, 2020), and brings positive economic bene-
fits in the long-run (Pavitt 2000; Salter and Martin 2001; Prettner
and Werner 2016). In order to stimulate the production of scientific
knowledge, science policies have been more and more committed to
‘planning and management’ of science (Dasgupta and David 1994).
Funding is often used by policy-makers to steer scientific research.
The funded research to some extent represents the intention of
policy-makers to support basic research, while in some cases it rep-
resents their intention to promote certain types of society-oriented
research (Braun 2003; Lepori 2006). As pointed out by Geuna
(1999), the goal of funding agencies is not to buy research services
but to succeed in reaching ‘the policy goals through the tool of the
research contract’ (Geuna 1999: 118).
Although most societies encourage scientists to publish their sci-
entific findings, the real value of science is its role as ‘an instrument’
and as ‘an input into economic productivity’, not the ‘value in itself’
(Johnson 1972: 16). Due to the fact that there is no standard to
judge the value or promise of science, the public attitude towards
science varies greatly across countries (Johnson 1972; Auranen and
Nieminen 2010). Similarly, Dasgupta and David (1994) hold that
scientific research is usually governed by ‘institutions and social
norms’ and that the form of knowledge produced depends on the
distinct rules of the research and incentive system. Nevertheless, the
performance of scientific research is judged largely by ‘scientific
standards’ (Johnson 1972; Stephan 1996; Auranen and Nieminen
2010).
Academic research output has been widely used as one criterion
to evaluate public funding. General public funding has been believed
to have a positive effect on scientific productivity. For instance,
Payne and Siow (2003) find that an increase of 1 million US dollars
in federal research funding to a university can lead to 10 more scien-
tific publications. Also in relation to Canada, it is found that public
research funding can help increase the number of scientific publica-
tions (Godin 2003; Beaudry and Allaoui 2012); the positive effect is
especially strong if the funding is higher than a certain threshold
(Godin 2003). Furthermore, Fedderke and Goldschmidt (2015)
stress the importance of funding amount, by suggesting that substan-
tial funding is associated with raised researcher performance.
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In addition to the relation between public funding and the quantity
of scientific output, studies have also shown that funded research
has a higher social impact compared to research without funding
support (Costas and van Leeuwen 2012; Go¨k, Rigby and Shapira
2016). Neufeld (2016) confirmed this for the biology field, by find-
ing a positive impact of funding on the publication counts, the total
citations, and the journal impact factor per paper.
However, opinions differ concerning the effects of competitive
public funding. Due to the extra resources provided by funding, and
the fact that research consortia are selected on the basis of competi-
tive tendering procedures, the quality of funded research is often
expected to be high (Auranen and Nieminen 2010). That is, superior
performance in the past increases the probability of being granted.
Hence, it is not the funding but the past performance that influences
future performance (Arora, David and Gambardella 1998).
2.2 Funding and scientific collaboration
Public funding not only spurs local basic research but also facilitates
research collaborations (Bozeman and Corley 2004). Funded proj-
ects are ‘collaborative in nature’ (Ma, Mondrago´n and Latora
2015), hence financial support makes it possible for researchers to
participate in conferences or visit research institutes abroad, which
in turn helps to set up collaborations between researchers from dif-
ferent countries. Through research funding, the intensity of collabor-
ation between partners can be greatly enhanced (Zhao et al. 2018).
Facilitated by the external funding, individuals are able to work to-
gether and integrate all kinds of knowledge resources to achieve the
common goal of producing new scientific knowledge. Laudel (2002:
5) defines research collaboration as a ‘system of research activities
by several actors related in a functional way and coordinated to at-
tain a research goal corresponding with these actors’ research goals
or interest’.
Funding from foreign countries, an indication of increased inter-
nationally collaborated research, has become more and more im-
portant for universities, and international research groups successful
in receiving external funding exhibit a higher probability of produc-
ing publishable research (Geuna 1999). It is generally expected that
researchers (teams) with larger grants would collaborate more and
to have more publications (Lee and Bozeman 2005). Competitive re-
search funding is by some seen as highly stimulating to research
productivity due to its creation of co-authorships (Ayoubi, Pezzoni
and Visentin 2018),
Toward understanding the relationship between funded collabo-
rations and research productivity, most studies have put efforts
mainly on the structure of the collaborations without giving much
attention to the different types of output stimulated by the funding
agencies. By focusing on the EU-funded research network, Defazio,
Lockett and Wright (2009) find that collaborations did not lead to
an increase in research production in the funding period, but a posi-
tive effect was found after the funding period. We would like to
challenge their conclusion that ‘it requires time to develop structures
of collaboration that are effective in enhancing researcher productiv-
ity’. In our opinion, research output is not (or not only) influenced
by the time it takes to set up effective collaboration structures but
also by the strategies of the funding agencies influencing the research
output. For example, some funding agencies may prioritize publica-
tions only, while others may be interested also in communication
with stakeholders. In the study by Defazio et al.(2009), it might
have been the case that, after the EU-funded projects had finished,
researchers became more productive because they got involved in
other funded (or unfunded) projects. We contend that collaborations
subsidized by different funding agencies would vary in the product-
ivity as well as the type of research output.
In this study, we aim to fill the above-mentioned gap in the lit-
erature. Namely, by focusing on the collaborative research pairs
supported by different types of funding resources, we investigate
whether different public funding agencies impact the research out-
put of their funded research differently, i.e. leads to different forms
of scientific output?
2.3 Empirical background—collaborations between
China and the EU28
China-EU collaboration has been strengthened by both China and
the European Union. In 1998, both parties signed the EU-China
Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, which was
renewed in 2004 and 2009. The document ‘A Long-Term Policy for
China-Europe Relations’, issued in 1995, stressed the necessity for
European Union to develop a long-term relationship with China and
introduced an action-oriented strategy to strengthen that relation-
ship (European Commission 1995). The Ministry of Science and
Technology of China (MOST) and DG Research and Innovation
signed the Agreement on Implementing the Science & Technology
Partnership Scheme (CESTYS) in May 2009. The National Natural
Sciences Foundation of China and DG Research and Innovation
signed an Administrative Arrangement in March 2010.
Efforts have been made to promote student exchange between
China and European Union. In 2012, 35,000 students from EU
member states studied in China; and according to Du Yubo, Vice
Minister of Education, 30,000 scholarships would be granted to
Chinese students to study in Europe in the period 2014–9 (Tuo
2013). There were nearly 1,000 Chinese participations in the Marie
Skłodowska-Curie programme between 2007 and 2013 (European
Union 2015).
With the mobility of researchers, there are on the one hand more
and more academic papers published jointly (Wang and Wang
2017), while on the other hand more and more researchers have
been involved in writing new project proposals to seek for potential
funding opportunities. According to reports from the European
Commission (2015, 2016a), in FP7, Chinese researchers were the
third most allocated to recipients of funding among non-European
researchers. In H2020, there were 187 eligible proposals with
Chinese organizations involved by 2015 (European Union 2015).
The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) is
the biggest basic research foundation in China, accounting for near-
ly half of the total public funding in China.1 Besides NSFC, there are
also other major core FOs such as the MOST and the National
Social Science Fund of China. In Europe, the Framework
Programmes (FPs) have been the main financial instruments via
which the European Union supports research and Innovation.
Recent FPs like FP7 (2007–13, e62.9 billion2) and H2020 (2014–
2020, e80 billion3) are the biggest funding programmes covering all
disciplines to foster research in the European Research Areas.
Besides the FPs, there are also discipline-specific funding types. For
instance, CERN4 (known as the European Council for Nuclear
Research) aims at establishing a world-class fundamental physics re-
search organization in Europe, EMBO (European Molecular
Biology Organization) funds research in life science.5 In addition to
FP7/H2020 and discipline-specific funding, the European Research
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Council and the Marie-Curie programme are also well-known re-
search funding sources in Europe.
The primary goals of the major research foundations in China
and in the EU seem to be similar to each other, i.e. to support re-
search and innovation, to improve scientific knowledge, and to pro-
mote excellent science. Taking one of the largest science foundations
in China (NFSC) as an example, the tasks of NFSC include to fund
creative and timely ideas to achieve excellence in science; to focus
on the frontiers of science in unique ways to lead the cutting edges;
to support application-driven basic research to enable break-
throughs; and to encourage transdisciplinary leading-edge research
to promote convergence. The ultimate goal of NFSC is to build a sci-
ence funding system that makes a ‘fundamental contribution to
strengthening original innovation capacity to become world’s lead-
ing science and technology power’ (National Natural Science
Foundation of China 2018: 2). In Europe, the primary priority of
H2020 is also Excellent Science, aiming to ‘reinforce and extend the
excellence of the Union’s science base and to consolidate the
European Research Area in order to make the Union’s research and
innovation system more competitive on a global scale’ (European
Commission 2016b: 4). ‘The overall goal is to ensure that Europe
produces world-class science and technology that drives economic
growth’. (European Commission 2016b: 5). Interestingly, although
the primary goals seem to be the same, the means to reach these
goals (i.e. funding evaluation system) can be different. We will
examine this topic further in the following sections.
3. Data and methodology
Publication count is often used as a proxy to evaluate scientific per-
formance (Stephan 1996). Publications resulting from funding must
include an acknowledgment of grant support, including the funding
agency and followed by the grant number(s). Funding acknowledge-
ment statements are usually included in the manuscript in the form
of a sentence under a separate heading entitled ‘Acknowledgement’
or ‘Funding’, if applicable. In early 2009, Web of Science released
new searching functions about funding information with three new
searching field tags, including FO (Funding Organization), FG
(Grant Number), and FT (Funding Text), which collect and extract
the funding acknowledgement statement from publications. These
new funding-related search field tags make it possible to analyse the
funding supported research output.
Publication data used in this study are collected from Clarivate
Analytics’ Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-E) and Social
Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). In our analysis, we focus on the
international collaborations at national level. Affiliation address is
used to identify the location of researchers. This study analyses in
total 115,816 joint publications between China and EU member
states in the period 2003–14. In this publication dataset, we further
have two sub-datasets: (1) publications without FO information
(2003–8) and (2) publications with the above-mentioned FO infor-
mation (2009–14). In the latter dataset, there are in total 81,996
joint publications between China and EU member states, and about
77% of these papers (62,928) acknowledged financial support from
funding agencies. FOs were first cleaned by VantagePoint software
and then names were checked manually. We have checked all the or-
ganization names which have funded no less than 10 publications in
the studied period. Some names that cannot be identified with the
countries and that funded few publications (<10) were not included.
There are two sets of funding data employed in this research.
The first set was collected from SCI-E and SSCI. Using VantagePoint
software, we extracted the field of FO from all the co-publications
between China and the EU28. Based on the location of FOs, we clas-
sify funding resources into three types: (1) China, (2) European
Commission (such as FP7, H2020, etc.), and (3) individual
European countries (such as national strategic programmes and bi-
lateral programmes with China).
The second set of funding data was provided by the European
Commission’s datawarehouse ECORDA. This dataset includes
funding proposals and projects granted in the European FPs. Our
study is based on data for the seventh Framework Programme (FP7)
and the early phase of H2020, covering the years 2007 until 2015.
There were in total 1,618 proposals jointly written by China and EU
states, of which 253 projects were granted with research funding
from the European Commission (either as FP7 or H2020 projects).
To examine the interaction between each pair among these 29 coun-
tries (28 EU members and China), partnership data have been trans-
formed into the format of a 2929 matrix, for both funded
projects and unfunded proposals. The matrix of funded projects at
year t is constructed as follows:
F1;1;t F1;2;t . . . . . . F29;29;t
F2;1;t
. . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . Fi;j;t . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
F29;1;t . . . . . . . . . F29;29;t
2
66664
3
77775
: (1)
Where Fi;j;t is the number of joint funded projects of country i
and country j at year t. Similarly, we also create the matrices for un-
funded proposals by year. Thus, we have 16 matrices6 for both fund-
ing proposals and granted projects in the period 2007–15. The same
method is also applied to construct the matrices of joint publications
for different countries in different years.
Our aim is to assess the publications and FP7/H2020 cooper-
ation between 29 countries in the social network datasets, thus we
use multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP)
to implement the regressions. All variables in the MRQAP regres-
sions are in the 2929 matrix format. For handling dyadic data
where pairs are linked, the quadratic assignment procedure has been
tested to be superior to ordinary least squares in both simple and
multiple regression models (Krackhardt 1988). In conducting the
MRQAP tests, we use the double semi-patriating permutation
method suggested by Dekker, Krackhardt and Snijders (see more
details in Dekker, Krackhardt and Snijders 2007).
In measuring the intensity of international scientific collabora-
tions, we adopt the Jaccard index (see also in Luukkonen et al.
1993).
CI ¼ COij
Pi þ Pj  COij : (2)
Where COij is the number of co-authored papers between coun-
try i and country j; Pi is the total publication number by country i;
and Pj is the total publication number by country j.
For the published joint research, funding resources are decom-
posed into three types: funded by China, funded by the EU, and
funded by individual EU member states.7 The shares of different
funding resources in country i at year t are calculated as follows:
CN fundedshareit ¼
CN funded publicationsit
all funded publicationsit
; (3)
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EU fundedshareit ¼
EU funded publicationsit
all funded publicationsit
; (4)
Own fundedshareit ¼
Own funded publicationsit
all funded publicationsit
: (5)
3.1 Control variables on the EU member state groups
and languages
Based on the year of joining the European Union, EU member states
are classified into three groups: before 2000, between 2001 and
2007, and after 2007 (see Table A.1). This information for each
country is further transformed into a relation matrix captured by the
variable of EU membership time group. Countries from the same
year group will be assigned the value 1, other countries will receive
the value 0.
Language barriers are often assumed to be an important factor
influencing collaboration communications. As EU member states
are greatly heterogeneous and there are 24 official languages in the
EU, our study takes into consideration the official languages that are
shared between countries. There are in total 14 official languages
that are shared by at least two countries (see Table A.2).8 Countries
sharing the same official languages are assumed to collaborate more
easily. The information of shared official languages is also trans-
formed into a relation matrix (2929).
4. Results
4.1 Collaboration intensity and funding structure
China and the EU28 have jointly published in total 81,996 papers in
the period between 2009 and 2014, and 76.7% of these publications
acknowledged funding support. In the sub-set of publications that
acknowledged funding agencies from either China or European
Union, there are 57,000þ records. By decomposing FOs into three
types (funded by China, funded by the EC, and funded by individual
EU member states), we find that the scientific research jointly pub-
lished between China and the EU28 has been mainly funded by
Chinese organizations. Around 80% of joint publications acknowl-
edged funding support from Chinese organizations. Following that,
funding from national level in EU member states also contributed to
48% of the joint publications, and about 13% of these joint publica-
tions received funding from the European Commission. It is worth
noting that one scientific publication can be supported by multiple
FOs, e.g. from both China and European Union.
Figure 1 plots the correlation between funding resources and
international collaboration intensity. This shows that the inter-
national collaboration intensity (measured by the Jaccard index) is
positively correlated with all these three types of funding (funded by
China, funded by the EC, and funded by individual EU member
states). Located on the right side of Figure 1, funding from China
has the highest share. National funding programmes from EU mem-
ber states contributed the second most. Funding from the European
Commission is located on the left with a relatively lower share. For
all of these three types of funding sources, there is a general positive
correlation between share of funding and international collabor-
ation intensity.
4.2 Research capacity and funding resources
To deepen our understanding of funding schemes, we connect fund-
ing resources with research capacity of each country. Figure 2 shows
that, in the process of collaborating with China, EU member states
with high research capacity (proxied by the number of total publica-
tions at national level) received a relatively small share of funding
from the European Commission. For instance, in the UK during the
period of 2009–14, on average 13% of the publications with fund-
ing acknowledgements were funded by the European Commission.
The share of EU funding9 was also low in Germany and Sweden;
15% and 18%, respectively.
Figure 1. Scatter plot of correlation between joint publication intensity and funding share (2009–14). Note: (1) The calculations for the funding shares are pro-
vided in Section 3 Equations (3–5). (2) Each point represents a country at one certain year.
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There is a long tail on the right side of the figure, mainly consist-
ing of small European countries with low research capacity. In those
countries, due to the lack of national government funding, the share
of EU funding is relatively high. Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY),
Estonia, Lithuania (LT), and Latvia (LV) are the countries which
had the highest shares of EU funding. In some cases, funded publica-
tions all acknowledged the funding from European Commission,
e.g. CY in 2010, and LV in 2010 and 2011.
On the contrary, funding from China exhibits a different pattern
(see Figure 3), with the long tail on the left side of the figure. In the
extreme cases—such as CY in 2009, LV in 2010 and Malta in 2010,
2011, and 2012—there were no publications sponsored by the
Chinese government. In other countries with low scientific capacity,
such as BG, Romania (RO), Greece, Hungary, and LT, the share of
publications funded by China was low in particular in the earliest
year, i.e. 2009.
However, in the countries with high research capacity (i.e. the
top players in the collaboration), such as the UK and Germany (DE),
on average 75% of the joint publications co-authored with Chinese
researchers were funded by Chinese organizations. This is in line
with earlier findings that research funding goes to ‘rich clubs’ (Ma,
Mondrago´n and Latora 2015; Szell and Sinatra 2015). This also
shows that there is a ‘Matthew effect’ in the funding system in
China, i.e. research groups with a higher profile (in terms of publica-
tion records) have a higher probability of receiving more funding.
In China, the core FO, the NSFC, is essential in providing finan-
cial support to basic scientific research. The NSFC is responsible for
almost 50% of the China-EU joint publications with funding ac-
knowledgement.10 Special programmes from the Chinese govern-
ment, such as Fundamental Research Funds for the Central
Universities and the 973 Program, also played an important role in
sponsoring joint publications between China and EU member states.
Funding from the China Scholarship Council, which aims to support
Chinese students to study abroad and foreign students to study in
China, has turned out to be another important resource in promot-
ing joint scientific publications.
In the EU, European Council for Nuclear Research, the
European Regional Development Fund, and the Marie Skłodowska-
Curie Programme appear to be most important (specific) pro-
grammes in funding joint publications between China and the
EU28. These programmes have turned out to be crucial in involving
also the small EU member states in the joint research.
4.3 Effect of funding and co-publications
In this section, we examine the relationships between joint funding
experiences and scientific co-publications. We use multiple regres-
sion quadratic procedure (MRQAP) to assess the impact of funding
projects (or proposals) upon research output, and vice versa.
Table 1 documents the regression results of the effect of FP7/
H2020 funded projects (or unfunded proposals) on the output of sci-
entific collaborations between China and the EU member states.
There are in total seven different dependent variables, i.e. (1) total
joint publications11 2011–4; (2) funded joint publications 2011–4;
(3) joint publications funded by China, EU, or individual EU coun-
tries; (4) joint publications funded by China; (5) joint publications
funded by the EC; (6) joint publications; and (7) joint publications
without any financial support from any funding agencies.
Model 1a examines the contributions of FP7 and H2020 pro-
posals and projects in the earlier years (2007–10) to the joint publi-
cations in the later years (2011–4). Interestingly, funded FP7/H2020
projects have a significantly negative effect on the number of joint
publications, which indicates that partnerships working in the same
funded FP7 or H2020 projects do not lead to joint publications.
One possible explanation may be that, in FP7/H2020 funded proj-
ects, much time and resources need to be spent on submitting deliv-
erables which are not academic publications, e.g. deliverables
relating to policy reports and stakeholder involvement.12 Another
explanation may be that some projects are related more to
Figure 2. Scatter plot of correlation between own research capacity (i.e. total publications) and share of EU funding (2009–14).
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innovation and to an R&D intensive, yet non-publishing industry
sector, and therefore less to academic research.
However, unfunded proposals significantly and positively con-
tribute to the joint research output. This reveals that rejected appli-
cations can still lead to successful output elsewhere. One example
comes from Norway, where in a survey among Norwegian research-
ers that had applied the Research Council of Norway for funding, a
majority of the respondents agreed that even though their applica-
tions were rejected, working on the applications was seemed as use-
ful because it was used in future applications, generated new project
ideas or established new collaborations with external partners
(Ramberg 2016). Another example relates to Switzerland. Ayoubi,
Pezzoni and Visentin (2018) found that taking part in a Swiss re-
search grant competition already boosted scientists’ number of pub-
lications, while it also extended their knowledge base and
collaboration network, regardless of whether the funding was
granted. These findings are in line with the patterns observed in our
study, i.e. even failed applications may be beneficial to future
collaborations.
Model 1b examines such contributions in the group of joint publi-
cations with funding acknowledgement, namely funded joint publica-
tions. The results of Model 1b are similar to those of Model 1a. That
is, funded FP7/H2020 projects had negative effect on the output of
joint publications, while unfunded proposals can lead to significant
positive contribution to the scientific output. To further explore this
issue, we test the contribution of unfunded FP7/H2020 proposals to
publications funded by different resources (Models 1c–f).
Models 1d–f show that failed FP7 (or H2020) proposal cooper-
ation has a significant and positive effect on producing joint publica-
tions which were funded by China, the EU, and individual EU
member states. Among these three cases, the coefficient in the
China-funded model (Model 1d) has the highest value (1.214). This
means that the experience of writing joint FP7 (or H2020) pro-
posals, though failed in getting EU funding, can contribute greatly in
obtaining funding from China in the later years. In Model 1g, we
test the effect of funded and unfunded FP7/H2020 projects on later
joint publications without any funding acknowledgement (so called
unfunded publications). The coefficients stay similar to those in the
earlier models.
If publications were sponsored by organizations from China
and/or the EU together with third parties, such publications are
included in ‘joint publications funded by China, EU, or individual
EU countries’ (column 1c). However, if articles were sponsored
purely by third parties (without European or Chinese organizations
involved), they are included in the sample in column 1h in Table 1.
Similar to the results in other groups, the regression for Group 1h
shows that failed FP7 or H2020 proposal cooperation can still lead
to joint publications funded by the third parties.
Explanations on the results regarding EU member state groups,
languages, and distances are provided in the next section on control
variables.
The relationship between co-publications and joint project col-
laborations can be tested in both directions. Following the above
analysis, which focused on the contribution of joint projects to joint
publications, here we also examine the contribution of co-
publications to later cooperation in writing project proposals.
Hoekman et al. (2013) find that scientific collaboration between
different regions in the European Union has a minor effect on
acquiring FP funding, and research funding significantly stimulates
co-publication activities between regional pairs ‘that did not inten-
sively co-publish before participation’. Our results in Table 2, how-
ever, suggest that in the process of collaborating with China, the
scientific collaborations in earlier years—rather than in later years—
have a stronger positive effect on joint funding proposals. Despite
this difference, this study and Hoekman et al. (2013) both demon-
strate the co-publication activities between EU member states in
later years, which will be further explained in the next section with
regard to control variables.
Figure 3. Scatter plot of correlation between own research capacity (i.e. total publications) and share of funding from China (2009–14).
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By dividing the joint proposals into two groups, i.e. funded and
unfunded, Table 2 also serves to test the funding selection bias. We
examine whether compared to other funding programmes FP7/
H2020 granted financial support to more non-academic partners, so
that consequently collaborations in FP7/H2020 do not lead to joint
publications. To test the funding selection bias (Arora, David and
Gambardella 1998),13 in Table 2, we investigate the contributions
of joint publications to the joint FP7/H2020 proposals. Joint publi-
cations are classified into two groups: the earlier years (during
2003–6) and the later years (during 2007–10). Joint FP7/H2020
proposals (Model 2a) is further decomposed into funded group
(Model 2b) and unfunded group (Model 2c). The results show that
the scientific collaborations in earlier years (during 2003–6)—rather
than in later years (during 2007–10)—have a stronger positive effect
on writing joint funding proposals (Model 2a). Most importantly,
the results are consistent for both funded projects (Model 2b) and
unfunded proposals (Model 2c). This indicates that joint academic
cooperation in the past contributed equally to the FP7/H2020
funded projects as well as unfunded proposals. In other words, there
is no evidence showing that FP7/H2020 funded projects are more
connected with collaborative partners with less joint publication ex-
perience. This confirms that a different performance in publications
in Table 1 is not caused by funding selection bias. (The explanations
on results related to control variables are provided in the next
section.)
4.4 Results about control variables
In Table 1, the significant negative coefficient of the EU membership
(time group) variable indicates that the ‘new’ EU member states
have been actively collaborating (in term of joint publications) with
the ‘old’ EU member states. This result, in line with Hoekman et al.
(2013), can also explain the intensive collaboration network in the
EU in recent years (Wang, Wang and Philipsen 2017). This signals
the integration process of European countries while conducting aca-
demic collaborations, in particular among countries that joined the
EU in different time groups.
The EU membership variable in Table 2 shows a positive effect
on joint FP7 or H2020 proposals. This suggests that, different from
conducting joint scientific publications, EU member states are still
fond of working on joint FP7 or H2020 projects with partners that
joined the EU at a similar time (mostly this concerns cooperation be-
tween ‘old’ members).
The EU membership group has also a significantly positive effect
on writing joint proposals in FP7 and H2020. This means that, in
writing joint proposals, more collaborations are observed between
EU member states that joined the EU at a similar time.
In relation to China-EU28 collaboration, language barriers and
geographical distance do not seem to be important in impeding sci-
entific collaborations. The evidence of such barriers to research col-
laborations have been investigated with much inconsistent findings.
Some studies have concluded that language spoken by partners or
their geographical proximity are not significant for research collab-
oration (Nokkala et al. 2008), while others, such as Guellec and
Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) argue that two countries are
more likely to collaborate if they are geographically close to each
other, if they have the similar technological specialization and if
they share a common language. In the case of Chinese-European col-
laboration in the period of 2007–15, both the geographical distance
and language differences do not seem to matter.
In general, we find that EU member states have been greatly inte-
grated in the process of collaborating with China, in particular in
terms of joint publications between ‘new’ EU member states and
‘old’ ones. One should bear in mind that the collaborations studied
here do not include cooperation only between EU partners, but col-
laborations between the EU and China. Namely, each joint publica-
tion or funding proposal examined in this study involves China.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Using co-publication and funding data between China and the
EU28, this study explores whether different public funding agencies
stimulate different research forms and outputs. Our results show
that scientific research funding from China greatly supports
Table 2. Results of quadratic assignment procedure regressions
Dependent variable Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c
Joint FP7 and H2020
proposals (2007–15)
Joint FP7 and H2020
funded projects (2007–15)
Joint FP7 and H2020
unfunded proposals (2007–15)
Intercept 0
(2.337)
0
(1.964)
0
(0.373)
Jointpub (2003–06) 1.443**
(0.357)
1.443**
(0.089)
1.429**
(0.268)
Jointpub (2007–10) 0.740
(0.107)
0.793
(0.028)
0.716
(0.078)
EU membership time group 0.227***
(54.778)
0.285***
(17.107)
0.206***
(37.671)
Geographical distance 0.185*
(0.013)
0.138
(0.002)
0.199*
(0.011)
Language 0.038
(10.677)
0.039
(2.712)
0.037
(7.965)
R2 0.661 0.572 0.682
N 812 812 812
Note: Standardized coefficient in parentheses.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01; ***P< 0.001.
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scientific research of top performers (partner countries with high re-
search capacity) while funding from the EU plays a crucial role in
supporting European countries with a low national research cap-
acity. This may reflect the different aims of different FOs. Chinese
funding agencies likely focus on the top players in order to achieve
immediate high publication output, while EC funding agencies often
set regional integration (EU internal market goals) as their priority.
In China, although the total amount of money spent by the
Chinese government is unknown, funding efforts have been greatly
turned into academic publications. We believe that this is related to
the funding evaluation system in China which stresses the import-
ance of immediate academic values (i.e. publications) that can be
measured directly, which is also apparently pursued in the priority
setting of the NSFC.14
This is also the case in many European countries where part of
the national funding of higher education institutions is typically de-
pendent on a performance-based activity measure like the number of
publications in Web of Science. It is often expected that partners
with larger grants would collaborate more and have more publica-
tions (Lee and Bozeman 2005). Large parts of the FPs in the EU are,
however, different. They stress the function of the projects as means
to creating and sharing knowledge which is not necessarily aimed at
scientific publishing, and thus difficult to measure in the short term.
EU funding programmes often emphasize the priority of regional in-
tegration and social networks in the European Union rather than
academic publications (Pavitt 2000). This may also explain the
results of Defazio, Lockett and Wright (2009) that funded collabo-
rations have no contribution to scientific output during the EU fund-
ing period, but do contribute positively after the projects are
finished.
Another interesting finding was that non-funded proposals—i.e.
collaborative FP7 or H2020 proposals that were rejected—contrib-
uted significantly to later publications. The experience of writing
joint FP7 or H2020 proposals, when a research consortium failed in
obtaining the funding it aimed for, can still lead to a successfully
funded project by a different sponsor (for instance a governmental
agency of an EU member state, other European research founda-
tions, or the Chinese government) and hence may contribute signifi-
cantly to the scientific output at a later stage. Interestingly, those
unfunded FP7 and H2020 proposals—if later funded by Chinese
funding agencies—will have the highest chance to produce joint
publications. This confirms the hypothesis that competitive funding
is one of the means for government to implement research policy.
We believe our results may signal a Chinese strategy to enhance the
overall research capacity of China (readily identifiable by, e.g.
bibliometric indicators), while the EU has downplayed such indica-
tors, turning its focus to more process-oriented indicators of the re-
search process (e.g. user-involvement, Open Access, Responsible
Research and Innovation, build-up of research capacity in new EU
member states).
Although initially aiming at the EU programmes funding, such
collaborations can significantly contribute to publications if they are
later funded by Chinese funding agencies. This indicates that, for a
certain research group with a potential amount of knowledge basis,
the final product delivered can be steered by the funding contract.
These findings highlight the key role that funding agencies play in
influencing research performance.
We agree with the literature (Stephan 1996; Arora, David and
Gambardella 1998) that funding agencies are likely to choose best
performers to implement their tasks. However, we would like to add
that the final form of research output is crucially dependent on the
specific public agency involved in the competitive funding (in our
example: Chinese or EU funding agencies).
There are several limitations to this study. One is that the publi-
cation dataset and FP7/H2020 proposal dataset are limited to China
and EU collaborations. Although it sufficiently shows the difference
between China and EU research policies, it does not cover the com-
plete picture of the funding systems in China or the EU. Second, this
study focuses on one type of scientific research output (WoS publica-
tions), and measures the quantity of scientific output, not the quality
of such output. Third, there exists some limitation of searching via
only FO (Funding agency) to extract funding information in WoS,
which may miss a part of funded records (Tang, Hu and Liu 2017;
Liu, Tang and Hu 2020). Further research covering these issues is
encouraged.
Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
Notes
1. See more in Li (2018) and http://main.sgg.whu.edu.cn/
uploads/soft/190321/2_1658006111.pdf.
2. https://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/archive/fp7_
monitoring_reports/7th_fp7_monitoring_report.pdf.
3. https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-hori
zon-2020.
4. CERN is an abbreviation of ‘Conseil Europe´en pour la
Recherche Nucle´aire’. See also at https://home.cern/about.
5. http://embo.org/.
6. Eight matrices for funded projects and eight for unfunded
proposals.
7. The share of publications funded by individual EU member
states is called ‘ownfunded_share’.
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages_of_the_European_
Union.
9. See Equation (4) for the calculation of the share of EU
funding.
10. Joint publications without funding acknowledgement were
not considered in this sample.
11. Joint publications refer to the publications jointly written by
at least one researcher from China and one researcher from
the EU member states.
12. Indirectly, some of these ‘non-academic’ deliverables may still
generate future academic output by researchers who are not
members of the consortium.
13. In the selection process, funding may more likely flow to cer-
tain types of researchers (or teams), depending on their past
performance.
14. Publications and patents are the important criteria used in ex-
post evaluations (see more in National Natural Science
Foundation of China 2018: 87).
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Appendix
Table A.1. Time groups of joining the European Union
EU 28 Country_code Before 2000 Between 2001 and 2006 Between 2007 and 2014
Austria AT 1
Belgium BE 1
Bulgaria BG 1
Croatia HR 1
Cyprus CY 1
Czech Republic CZ 1
Denmark DK 1
Estonia EE 1
Finland FI 1
France FR 1
Germany DE 1
Greece EL 1
Hungary HU 1
Ireland IE 1
Italy IT 1
Latvia LV 1
Lithuania LT 1
Luxembourg LU 1
Malta MT 1
Netherlands NL 1
Poland PL 1
Portugal PT 1
Romania RO 1
Slovakia SK 1
Slovenia SI 1
Spain ES 1
Sweden SE 1
UK UK 1
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Table A.2. Shared official languages in EU member states
Croatian Czech Danish Dutch English French German Greek Hungarian Irish Italian Slovak Slovenian Sweden
Austria 1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1
Bulgaria
Croatia 1 1
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1 1
Denmark 1 1
Estonia
Finland 1
France 1
Germany 1 1
Greece 1
Hungary 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1
Italy 1 1 1 1
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg 1 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1
Poland
Portugal
Romania 1
Slovakia 1 1 1
Slovenia 1 1 1
Spain
Sweden 1
UK 1 1
Sum 2 2 2 2 3 4 6 2 5 2 3 3 4 2
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages_of_the_European_Union.
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